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Laine: response to Cady

Response
James W. Laine
Whatever criticisms I might have must come after an expression of
real appreciation of the depth of scholarship and real insight clearly
manifest in Professor Cady’s address. My comments here will only
open a few areas for further reflection among the many that we might
consider.
I want to divide my response into two parts; a response first to her
diagnosis of the issue and then to her proposed cure.
I. Diagnosis
I am in sympathy and accord with Cady’s primary analysis, especially her portrayal of secularism as a powerful discourse that is often
masked as a kind of reasonable natural arena, a neutral ground we
can all share, regardless of our religious commitments. That neutral
ground can be defended as a space free of religion, the sort of discourse the French call laïcité and Cady references as “laicist secularism.” Or it can be a place where a vaguely Protestant system of values
that all of us “regular folks” can accept is democratically supported by
the majority without resorting to the establishment of any particular
sect or church.
This second version now assumes a kind of unspecific Judeo-Christian civic religion, or even a broader inclusivist natural religion of good
people everywhere. Both of these versions of secularism assume the
supremacy of the nation-state over the church. The modern nationstate, coming into existence in sixteenth-century Europe, struggled
mightily and violently to gain political supremacy over the church,
but now that supremacy is largely taken for granted in North America
and western Europe. One must necessarily ask, is religion that is thus
removed from the offices of final, legitimate exercise of social control
and political power still at all the same thing as religion exercising final
and absolute authority in matters of truth and government?
It is instructive to look at two contrasting styles of secularism,
French and British, both premised upon the supremacy of the state
over religion, but treating a common vexed issue in contrasting ways.
That issue is the wearing of the veil by Muslim schoolgirls. According
to French laïcité (like Turkish secularism), a public institution, such
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as a school, cannot be a place where religious expressions are on display. Consequently, no veils are allowed. Here, the argument goes, all
citizens are welcomed into a common French culture, but the price of
admission is the surrendering of any aspect of identity that alienates
one from that common culture. It represents the heritage of an Enlightenment value of replacing religion with a common, laicist national
culture.
The British approach shows an interesting multiculturalist contrast.
A legal case was adjudicated in England during the summer of 2007
in which a state-funded school with a largely Muslim student body
accommodated Muslim girls with a school uniform that included a
modest head covering. A committee of parents and teachers agreed
to this standard. One girl, however, thought this dress was not sufficiently Islamic and claimed that in her version of Islam, she needed to
be completely covered in a burqa—no face showing, no arms, etc. In the
British version of this controversy, a multiculturalist accommodation
of Muslim dress went so far, but then stopped. The girl lost her court
case and was told to wear the school uniform or find another school
(and there was in fact one for burqa-clad girls).
The British style of accommodation represents an interesting example of what Cady calls the “interactive and pluralistic border zone
between religious and secular discourses and practices.” One can
attend state-funded but religious schools in Britain—there are Anglican, Catholic, Jewish, and Muslim schools. They are all tax-funded and
tuition-free, yet also have school-sponsored occasions for the expression of sectarian piety. Such a policy would be unthinkable in France.
According to the establishment clause of the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, it would seem that Americans would also find it
unthinkable, except for the fact that charter schools accommodating
Islamic practice have nowadays become quite common, as we learn
from Liza Baer’s essay in this volume. But even while religious values
are invited into these British schools, the curriculum and system of
examinations is in line with a national standard. We cannot imagine,
for example, a case of a British school being allowed to challenge the
theory of Darwinian evolution on religious grounds. The state retains
the right and the power to exercise final authority in the matter of all
religious accommodations.
Two quick conclusions present themselves:
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1. If the government will accommodate a diversity of religious practices and ideas, where does it draw the line? This is the issue in Winnifred Sullivan’s brilliant book, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom.1
She examines a Florida legal case over the degree to which a public
cemetery should accommodate the religious devotional expressions
(placing a variety of vertical decorations on graves) of persons practicing a wide diversity of traditions. She concludes that it becomes
impossible for the state to determine what is a traditional practice
required by a particular religion and what is simply a matter of
individual, personal taste. As soon as the state (here represented
by the judge making a ruling) decides what is actually required
by a particular tradition, like Sunni Islam, or Greek Orthodoxy, or
Reformed Judaism, he or she has taken over the role of theologian,
normatively essentializing and standardizing a tradition that may in
fact have enormous internal diversity.
2. Both kinds of secularism (French and British) leave the state government intact as the final arbiter. Religion occupies the space circumscribed by the political institutions that exercise legitimate power.
One should note here how all manner of public institutions follow
a calendar that is basically Christian but appears to the laicist as
neutral, until such time as a follower of a religion rooted in a radically different culture asks to be recognized. And where would that
lead? Can one imagine a school calendar that would accommodate
the holidays of Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, Seventh Day Adventist Christians; Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, Reconstructionist
Jews; Sunni, Shi’i (Twelver and Ismaili) Muslims; Sikhs, Hindus,
Zoroastrians, Pure Land Buddhists…?! Here the border between
what we idealize in a Protestant way as the proper private space for
religion, and the social fact of our living together in common institutions, reveals itself to be highly contested.
Moreover, any religious expression, practice, or idea that crosses
a line determined by secular political powers may very well be prosecuted (for instance, polygamy or ritual drug use). That is to say, in a
secularist society, the state, functioning as a putatively neutral adjudicator between a variety of non-established religions, turns out to be not
so neutral after all, but rather an institution embracing, and depending
upon, an ideology that contains many of the same sorts of elements
once contained in “The True Faith.” It stands in for the Holy Mother
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Church, upholding doctrines so obviously true that we, the dominant
majority population, take them for granted.
This is a rather harsher way of putting the case that Cady has made!
The secular world—whether influenced by shared religious or nonreligious values—has coercive power, the kind of coercive power wielded
in medieval times by the Church. The most coercive discourse is one
that remains masked and unmarked. Secularism has had that sort of
role until challenged by some unlikely bedfellows:
1. The conservative evangelical, decrying “secular humanism” as an
ideology and quasi-religion that opposes Christianity;
2. The follower of Islam or another religion whose practices conflict
with the taken-for-granted practices of a dominant society that is
not as “post-Christian” as secularists assume;
3. The post-modern critic of the Enlightenment.
This unmasking is frightening, for when a certain “background” is
assumed, a society can proceed on the basis of shared values, rhythms,
etc. Once that is ripped apart, the very basis of legitimacy is unstable
and the final arbiter becomes the one with the greatest military power,
as in the case of the bloody European wars of religion.
Does our own world of bloody conflict signal a return to those days
of uncertainty?
II. The Cure
This situation leaves us with some uncomfortable realities. For me, it
will never be possible to fairly adjudicate between a host of religious
traditions and cultures from a truly neutral space. The place of adjudication will inevitably be the place of final power. From that perspective, final authority has shifted from the Church to the State, and
secularism stands in for The Faith. Cady, however, has adopted a more
sanguine view, beginning with an optimism following the election of
President Obama.
According to Professor Cady, Obama provides us with a new model:
the “pluralistic, interactive border between religious and the secular…”
Here there will be:
1. Constitutional separation of church and state;
2. Decoupling of religious and national identities; and
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3. The “Democratic virtue of translating religious values and visions
into more universal language that fellow citizens within a diverse
society can understand.”
I argue that this new model simply demotes Christianity from the
role of taken-for-granted faith informing the values declaimed as secular, and replaces it with something more inclusive, but still rather critical of traditions not embracing French Enlightenment virtues. Here,
a broadly tolerant, Vedantic neo-Hinduism might fit nicely under the
umbrella of this “universal language” whereas a strict constructionist
Sunni legalism does not.
Cady also mentions the flexibility within our cultural discourse that
seems to open up when individuals seek a “spirituality” rather than
membership in an institutional “religion”: “Individuals increasingly
shop the spiritual market place in their personal quest for a more tailor
made religiosity.” This very capitalist bourgeois approach, however,
cedes the really crucial issues of our shared public life to secular institutions, like schools, courts, etc. Religion is then not politically intrusive.
As “spirituality” becomes a dabbling in Tai Chi or a book group discussion of gnosticism or mysticism, it turns into something comfortably unthreatening to the secularists who exercise real political power
in the name of quasi-religious values like peace, freedom, democracy,
gender equality, and tolerance (all praised even while waging war).
To open up public discourse to the wellsprings of religion while
not privileging any one religion or type of religion sounds like a fine
idea, but if we “decouple religion from national identity,” we will still
have to forge some kind of national identity informed by religious or
ideological tradition, and our powerful institutions will still operate
in the name of that consensus, a consensus that will always favor some
groups and marginalize and exclude others. To me that signals the victory
of secularism, a victory 500 years in the making (according to Charles
Taylor2). Secularism is not, perhaps, that neutral ground where all religions can gather, but the common ground where those religions that
are willing to accept their dethronement from places of final legitimacy
and authority can contend and fight for attention. It is the sovereign
nation-state that claims final authority in all things, even if it is willing
to make a place for some of the religions that are allied to its projects
and purposes.
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Notes
1. Winnifred Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 2005).
2. Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007).
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